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ABSTRACT
19th century 
American utopias 
as destratification 
experiments
by
T. P. Schwartz
Ph. D. in Sociology 
University of North Carolina, USA
The destratification experiences of a number of the more 
important 19th century American utopias, with emphasis on 
the Oneida and Shaker communities, are described and are 
evaluated as to individual and communal costs and benefits. 
While these utopian ventures were often quite successful as 
destratification experiments, at least for brief periods of time, 
the factors that contributed to this success, and the factors 
that contributed to the longterm viability of the communities 
as social systems, were often antithetical. The implications 
of this study concerning a number of important issues in 
stratification theory are discussed.
I. introduction
The great seal of the United States is inscribed with 
the words 'Novus Ordo Sec lo rum’—a new order of 
the ages. After nearly 200 years of service perhaps 
that epigram might be revised to read more correct­
ly—-«new orders of the ages.» For a most remark­
able quality of the new order has been its willingness 
to permit so many other relatively autonomous and 
often abrasive orders the opportunity to secede 
from it While yet remaining within it.1
Perhaps the best and the most extreme examples 
of this unique tolerance are the 19th century Ameri­
can communal experiments. For many of these ex­
periments not only attempted to devise and imple­
ment new orders of ideology, behavior, and social 
structure, but they purpose.y attempted new orders 
that Were antithetical to the order of the greater so­
ciety. These were often counter-orders, or, counter­
cultures, in modern parlance. The idea of a rather 
unique tolerance between the greater society and its 
discontents is important for another reason, how­
ever. In analyzing the factors behind the very limited 
duration of most of these experiments it becomes ap­
parent that this tolerance was a primary factor in 
contributing to their demise. To use a biological 
concept, toleration acted somewhat like a permeable 
membrane, or a rather open exchange system, that 
not only permitted the communities to implement 
their social designs with little intimidation, but con­
currently enabled the greater society to profit and 
learn from those exercises and to reabsorb those 
experiments (and experimenters) that became disen­
chanted with their own discontent.
By and large, these communities failed to endure 
not so much because of internal problems or be­
cause of a confrontation with the greater society,
1. With but one exception, these secessions were less than 
complete since the new orders continued to recognize the sov­
ereignty of the United States government over them. The 
secessions were generally seen as secessions from the society 
rather than from the government. The exception, of course, 
was the secession of the Southern states. The consequence was 
the Civil War.
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but because they could not compete, in the long run, 
with a society that provided greater tolerance and 
individual opportunity than themselves. This was as 
true of the ideology and the social structure as it was 
of the distributive processes they attempted to estab­
lish.
The voluntary re-affiliation of many of the radical 
social experiments and experimenters with the larger 
society is one of the most unique features of the 
19th century American communal experiments. 
They were certainly not unique social phenomena in 
many other ways, since they were informed by uto­
pian thinking and experimentation dating back to at 
least Plato’s Republic (Holloway, 1951:23). More 
immediate roots, however, date back to the sectar­
ian movements in France, England, and Germany 
that followed on the heels of the Protestant Reforma­
tion. Frustrated by political and religious intolerance 
in Europe, many of these sects emigrated to North 
America starting about the middle of the 17th cen­
tury (Bestor, 1970: Chapter 2). Although a number 
of these sects attempted to establish at least partial­
ly communistic societies rather than be integrated 
into the colonial social system, it was not until late 
in the 18th century that a discernible movement to­
wards communal experimentation began.1 Within 
this movement, sometimes called the rise of commu­
nitarian socialism in America (Bestor, 1970), the ex­
periments were as diverse in form as they were in 
goals and success, so that classification according to 
some unit characteristic is nearly impossible except 
for time (19th century), place (America), distributive 
orientation (socialistic /communistic), and, to a 
certain extent, a shared cultural tradition. The emer­
gence of this movement at this point in time has been 
attributed to a number of factors which either made 
this kind of social experimentation more attractive, 
or which made other alternatives, such as the status 
quo, more repulsive. Factors that attracted groups 
and individuals to communal experimentation were: 
the general optimism of the era, the supposed suc­
cess of the English Revolution of 1648 and the French 
Revolution of 1789, the widespread encouragement 
of social experimentation by such luminaries as 
Rousseau, Descartes, and St. Simone, the elevation 
of democratic and radical egalitarian ideals, the im­
pact of Romanticism, and the availability of the A- 
merican frontier at bargain prices. Factors that re­
pulsed them from existing societies were: the expan­
sion of industrialization and urbanization (particu­
larly in England), the increase in conscriptive govern­
ment service and internecine warfare in many Euro­
pean states, increasing religious and political intoler-
1. It was at about this time that secular communes emerged. 
Prior to this, efforts at communal living were primarily sec­
tarian.
ance, the pervasiveness of capitalistic and com- 
rr.ercialistic pursuits, and the harshness of an under­
developed, underpopulated, and underprotected 
frontier (Kanter, 1967: 39; Andrews, 1963: xii; Nord­
hoff, 1965: xxiii). Additionally, there were fewer at­
tractive forces at play in the greater society. Achieve­
ment and success were more easily measured by 
one’s accomplishments on the periphery of establish­
ed society than within it. Men were encouraged to 
«go West», individually, in order to build their own 
society (or, more typically, their own fortunes).
For the purposes of this paper, however, the most 
important characteristic of these experiments is 
their communistic distributive orientation. Although 
in many of them communism was far more a fleeting 
ideal than an actuality, all of them did at some time 
or another commit themselves to such an ambition. 
Given this hiatus and the many differences in ideol­
ogy, structure, and success of the numerous utopian 
communities, attempts to compare and to generalize 
from them are often frustrating and unsuccessful 
(cf. Carden, 1969: xviii; Kanter, 1967: 40).Tn order to 
give some indication of both the range and the cen­
tral tendency (to the extent that a central tendency can 
be assumed to exist) of the distributive processes in 
these communities, two of the more important and 
well documented of them, the Shaker communities 
and the Oneida community, will be considered along 
with the communal movement as a whole. In order 
to understand these stratification experiments more 
fully, the social organization of the communities in 
which they occurred and the factors related to the 
overall success of the experiments will be considered. 
Since the stratification systems are of primary con­
cern, however, only a most cursory review of the 
components of social organization that bear most 
directly on the distributive systems will be made. 
Following that, the goals and the achievements of 
the stratification experiments will be discussed along 
with the costs and benefits that were realized by in­
dividual members of the experiments and by the 
greater society as a result of these experiments. Fi­
nally, the importance of these experiments to strati­
fication theory and to knowledge about stratifica­
tion processes will be considered. One editorial com­
ment is in order. Since a wealth of descriptive infor­
mation exists on the more historically interesting 
aspects of these experiments, and since there is a 
rather high degree of correspondence in these de­
scriptions, the use of references will be limited to the 
more important and controversial assertions.
II. social organization
During the 19th century over 100 communal ex­
periments involving in excess of 100,000 people were
251
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 07:09:16 |
Έπιθεώρησις Κοινωνικών 1Ερευνών, y καί δ' τρίμηνον 1974
FIGURE 1: Chronology of the more important 19th century communal experiments
/------------------------ Sectarian -------------------------- y y------------------- Secular
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attempted in the United States. Few of the experiments 
lasted more than a decade although there were no­
table exceptions such as Amana and some of the Shak­
er communities, which continue to exist at the pres­
ent time, although in either a radically different form, 
or as dying survivals.1 Figure 1 provides a chronolog­
ical review of the more important experiments as 
reported by Bushee (1905). The sectarian-secular 
classification reflected in Figure 1 was a very real and 
important one that most historians agree distin­
guishes between two very different approaches to 
communal experimentation and often to the success 
(measured by longevity) achieved. On the average, 
the sectarian experiments of the century lasted 24 
years while the secular ones lasted less than 4 years 
(Bushee, 1905: 650). Only the more prominent relig­
ious experiments are indicated in the figure along 
with the number of communities belonging to each 
type, listed in parentheses. With the exception of I- 
caria, which was a single experiment, Bushee aggre­
gated the secular experiments into three groups 
based on their prevailing ideologies.
Concerning the histories of Shakerism and the 
Oneida community, the former was brought to the 
United States from England by Ann Lee and a hand­
ful of disciples in 1774, while Oneida community was 
founded in upstate New York by John Humphrey 
Noyes in 1848. Shaker communities were founded 
throughout the United States with increasing fre­
quency until the Civil War, thereafter Shakerism 
gradually declined to its present status of 3 destitute 
«families» of less than 50 members. Oneida existed 
very robustly until 1879, at which time it was trans­
formed into a joint stock company by its remaining 
members. It has continued to exist as a corporation 
community up to the present time, although not with­
out considerable difficulty.
The demographic characteristics of the communal 
experiments considered as a whole almost defy spec­
ification since the differences between individual 
communities were so extreme. It does appear, how­
ever, that in the absense of a radical family or sexual 
ideology, most of the experiments attempted to a- 
chieve, and were fairly successful in achieving mem­
berships with distributions of demographic charac­
teristics approximating those of the greater society 
although with slightly higher proportions of females 
and the aged, and particularly, of aged females. As 
those agrarian communities with traditional family 
organization endured, the distribution of population 
approached that of a rather model population pyra­
mid. This was far less the case in most of the Shaker
1. The factual information in this section is based on histor­
ical data provided by most of the sources listed in the Bibli­
ography.
communities, where celibacy limited the young to 
those that could be recruited along with a parent or 
guardian, or to those that could be joined by other 
means, at times bordering on the illegal. Apparently 
the communities remained interested in having 
children within the fold despite their marginal produc­
tivity and the high attrition through voluntary separa­
tion once the children reached adult status (Andrews, 
1963: 228). The Oneida population tended to have a 
slightly disproportionate number of young adults 
and children until Noyes and the original members 
aged and until they perfected their own system of 
«planned parenthood» and population control through 
complex marriage, 'coitus interruptus’ (via with­
drawal), and eugenics.
Considering the social characteristics of the par­
ticipants in the communal movement it is apparent 
that while the majority of them were at least descend­
ed from white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, usually of 
the lower class, and were themselves often only semi­
skilled and semi-educated, there were many impor­
tant exceptions, particularly among the sectarian 
communities, where quite often the entire communi­
ty would be of lower-middle or of middle class Ger­
man or French descent. Many historians report that 
the ideal type agrarian communalists (and often the 
most successful ones) were of German peasant stock 
because these people were particularly suited for the 
wholesome but tedious, uneventful, and mindless 
sort of labor and life that maintained the experiments. 
There were noteworthy exceptions of course. Brook 
Farm, a Fourierist experiment composed almost en­
tirely of intelligensia, existed in remarkable harmo­
ny—but for only three years (Holloway, 1951: 53). 
The original communalists of Oneida were generally 
middle and upper-middle class, often with some uni­
versity or professional training or at least several 
skills that could be profitably employed to the bene­
fit of the community. On the other hand, the original 
Shakers, along with most of their converts, were of 
a distinctly lower class origin, often unskilled, poor­
ly educated, and not infrequently impoverished.
The social origins of the communalists and the ex­
periments they instigated, no matter how diverse, 
were reflected in the ideologies that undergirded and 
gave legitimacy to their practices and social struc­
tures. Their ideologies, therefore, were as varied as 
they were critical to the success of the undertakings. 
To a certain extent they all embraced some form of 
social equality more extreme than the greater socie­
ty. And, for at least some brief period, most of them 
embraced some form of communism, although in 
practice this ideal varied from pure communism 
(the original Shakers) to collectivism (the Scientific 
experiments) to near capitalism (the later Zoar Sep- 
artists). A more important consideration than the
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extensity of a communist ideology in an experiment 
was the primacy of the ideology. Generally in the sec­
tarian experiments the communist ideology was sec­
ond to some general system of religious belief. It 
was a means rather than an end in itself. Thiswas very 
much the case in the Shaker communities, where 
the goal of most members was individual Christian 
salvation, not communism (Andrews, 1963: 27). And 
yet they professed, practiced, and almost achieved 
a total state of pure communism (Hinds, 1961: 6). 
The Shakers also believed in total celibacy, total seg­
regation but the equality of the sexes, withdrawal 
from worldly pursuits and the greater society, and the 
spiritual and purgative value of physical labor.
The Oneida community ideology initially balanced 
religious and communistic orientations. The religion 
was an abstract unwritten code of spiritual behavior 
called perfectionism that struck a favorable and flex­
ible balance between the individual and the commu­
nal good by requiring individual members to per­
fect themselves through sacrifice to the community. 
For all practical purposes the Oneida ideology was 
a manifestation of the personal ideology of its foun­
der and autocrat, John Humphrey Noyes, whose 
personal brand of total communism came to include 
complex marriage (marriage to the community rather 
than to individuals), male continence, eugenics and a 
unique concept called «spiritual ascendancy» that 
served as the basis for the distribution of spiritual 
and material privileges.
The social structures of the communal experiments 
were at least as diverse as the ideologies they professed. 
Community size ranged from 20 to 2000 members 
of all ages with the average size at around 200. A 
community approaching either of these extremes 
would generally either attach itself to a larger ideo­
logically similar community or it would divide—-one 
element establishing a new community with the as­
sistance of the parent community. Most often the 
new community would locate within 10 miles of the 
parent unit although there were many notable excep­
tions in which the distance covered several states. 
This pattern of growth by division is particularly de­
scriptive of the expansion of Shakerism across the 
United States.
Most of the experiments retained the traditional 
family form as the basic social unit, although a con­
siderable number at least attempted alternative forms 
during part of their existence (Kanter, 1967: 88). 
Whenever the family structure was retained it was 
usually the primary, and most often the only, organ­
izational unit within the community besides the gov­
erning body of the community. In the case of com­
munities where the traditional family form was dis­
banded, such as in the Shaker and Oneida communi­
ties, alternate «family» forms were devised wherein
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a group of 20 to 100 individuals of both sexes and of 
all ages were formed into a social and residential u- 
nit often called a «family» (the Shakers), or the entire 
community was considered to be one large fami­
ly, sometimes living together under the same roof 
(Oneida). In some cases, particularly with the more 
successful religious experiments, individual commu­
nities were organized and were governed through 
some extra-local authority system most often based 
in the original community of the sect and considered 
to be the sect headquarters. This was the case with 
the Shakers—-where an extremely powerful, nation­
ally centralized and coordinated power structure 
developed. More often, the regulatory influence of 
extra-local authority units tended to diminish with 
time and with the demise of the original members of 
the movement. Most often the communities ad­
mitted little more than an ideological or spiritual 
debt to extralocal structures and existed as autono­
mous units.
Authority relations within the communities varied 
considerably. Often, while democratic principles were 
espoused or while written formal ordinances and 
codes of law existed, authority nonetheless rested with 
the original founder (i.e., Oneida), a handful of his 
disciples, or with successors selected by the founder 
or founders (i.e., the Shakers). In the religious com­
munities, religious and political functions and struc­
tures were often combined.
The economic organization of the more successful 
communities was usually centrally controlled and 
coordinated by the community itself, and Was based 
on both agriculture and manufacturing. Often the 
communities engaged in retail sale of their products 
and provided services, in the form of schools, hotels, 
transportation, and equipment maintenance. The 
Shaker communities restricted their economic activ­
ity more to farming and handicraft, furniture, and 
clothing manufacturing than to other pursuits that 
would require greater contact with the outside world. 
Oneida community was just the opposite, for its mem­
bers gradually came to own and operate a number of 
manufacturing, commercial, and service activities 
(such as a noteworthy preparatory school) that em­
ployed several hundred employees (Carden, 1969: 42).
Perhaps, in conclusion, some mention needs to be 
made about the very crucial recruitment and expul­
sion practices of the communal experiments. While, 
typically, the practices varied greatly, it appears that 
the ability and willingness of a community to recruit 
members with ideologies and behavior consistent 
with its own, and to expel them neatly should that not 
prove to be the case, was crucial to the preservation 
of the community. Very few of the communities tried 
to compel dissatisfied members to remain. Often 
they were provided With sufficient funds to enable
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them to relocate in the outside world without fear of 
immediate deprivation. The Shaker communities ex­
perienced increasing difficulty from the 1820’s in re­
cruiting «qualified» members. They resorted to all 
sorts of recruitment mechanisms from traveling re­
vivals, to advertisements, to the procurement of or­
phans—often at the cost of rupturing relations with 
surrounding villages (Holloway, 1951: 69). Their in­
doctrination program subjected the novitiates to the 
scrutiny and often the torment of the entire commu­
nity for more than a year while the novitiates gave 
evidence of a complete ideological conversion and 
renounced all allegiance to the outside world. Shak­
er expulsion and mortification mechanisms were 
equally harsh and effective.
Recruitment was far less a problem at Oneida where 
there were many attractive and somewhat unique 
economic, cultural, and «social» incentives. Selection 
of new members was primarily handled by Noyes 
himself, who apparently exercised considerable dis­
cretion in choosing only those who could contribute 
something of value (either wealth, talent, or «culture») 
to the community (Carden, 1969: 26, 37). Ap­
parently his selection criteria were excellent since 
there is little evidence of expulsions or secessions 
from Oneida (Carden, 1969: 80).
III. the stratification experiment in the 
Shaker communities
The formal distributive goal of the Shaker experi­
ment was total communism, as evidenced in this ex­
cerpt from the original Shaker covenant signed in 
1795:
All the members that should be received into the Church, 
should possess one Joint Interest, as a Religious right, that is, 
that all should have Just and Equal rights and Privileges, ac­
cording to their needs, in the use of all things in the Church, 
without Any difference being made on account of what any of 
us brought in, so long as we remained in Obedience to the Or­
der and Government of the Church, and are holden in relation 
as members. All of the members are likewise Equally holden, 
according to their abilities, to maintain and support one Joint 
Interest in union, in Conformity to the order and Government 
of the Church (Andrews, 1963: 62, emphasis added).
Other covenants reaffirmed the official position of 
the order concerning the total social equalization of 
differences based on age, sex, race, education and 
wealth. All privileges were to be equalized through 
sharing and charity.
Many historians agree that a number of the Shak­
er communities came closer to achieving a pure 
functional communism than any of the communities 
that endured for any significant length of time (cf. 
Andrews, 1963: xiii; Hinds, 1961: 115). This estimate 
certainly applies to the level of economic equality a­
chieved in the Shaker communities. There is little 
evidence of any noteworthy inequality concerning per­
sonal property or income among the members. This 
is one of the few examples of a communal experiment 
in which the «real» did, in fact, approximate the «i- 
deal.» All property and income belonged to the com­
munity. All candidates for admittance to the commu­
nity were required to sign over all personal property 
(and inheritance) to the community. And although 
they were permitted to retract the same property 
should they resign from the brotherhood, they could 
not claim interest or returns for their labor. These 
restrictions were supported by federal and state court 
decisions (Andrews, 1963: Chapter IV). Apparently 
there was complete communality of surplus as well 
as property across all status levels (Andrews, 1963: 
106). There was very little occupational stratification 
except for the two levels of the church hierarchy, and 
these were considered to be roles more than occupa­
tions. Every member of the Shaker society was 
skilled in at least one trade—even the bishop—and 
there was an ordinance that required that jobs be 
rotated and that all members perform manual labor 
with some regularity (Andrews, 1963: 106). In actual­
ity, however, it appears that these regulations were 
more or less subverted through a semi-official prac­
tice called the «deacon system» which assured that 
the deacons did precious little of the manual labor, 
among other things. While there was considerable 
differentiation of occupations, there is no evidence 
that differentiated occupations received differential 
rewards, except, perhaps for some increased prestige.
There is no evidence of significant sex or educa­
tional inequality among the Shakers. The more tal­
ented students received slightly more attention, but 
since the schooling was limited to applied subjects, 
and since all education outside the community was 
considered superfluous, very little educational strati­
fication resulted. Apparently sexual equality was 
achieved and Was maintained although there is some 
question as to how well represented women were in 
the religious hierarchy.
Status group differences were minimized. In fact 
the Shakers emphasized the equality of all races and 
nationalities in their religious ceremonies. While the 
historical record is incomplete and sometimes slight­
ly contradictory on the matter, the Shakers were active 
in the anti-slavery movement, they encouraged blacks 
to join the society as members, and they apparently 
treated them equally in most respects (Andrews, 
1963: 169).
The most significant aspect of the Shaker’s distribu­
tive system, from a cynical standpoint, at least, 
was the substantial religious-political inequality that 
existed. Although authority was based on the many 
Shaker covenants as well as on an incredibly restric­
255
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 07:09:16 |
*ΕπιθεώρησιςΚοινωνικών *Ερευνών, y καί δ' τρίμηνον 1974
tive set of ordinances called the Millennial Laws, a 
religious-political hierarchy emerged whose mem­
bers could exercise almost absolute power and priv­
ilege. This system at times almost approximated a 
religious elite despite the fact that Shaker govern­
ment was originally founded as a participatory de­
mocracy.
Another source of disunity, doubtless inevitable in a theoc­
racy, was the tendency of the system to produce two classes, 
those who governed and consequently had opportunities for 
individual initiative and development, and those who were 
governed and lacked the same facilities for self-expression. All 
were subjects to the same religious discipline. In theory the 
leaders were the greatest servants. But in practice it must be 
admitted that the assumption of responsibilities carried with 
it privileges, powers, and freedoms denied to the commonalty. 
Signs of discontent among the governed, particularly the 
youthful members, first appeared in the western communities. 
Surrender of property and 'confinement to small areas of 
land,’ one observer wrote, were not western ideals; irritation 
was felt over the rule of strict obedience (Andrews, 1963: 236, 
emphasis added).
The authority of this self-perpetuating ministry was abso­
lute, without appeal. It appointed its own successors, without 
election, and exacted implicit obedience. The leading elders, 
or 'leading characters’ as they were sometimes called, heard 
all confessions, knew the whereabouts and occupations of eve­
ry Shaker in their family, conducted the initiation of novices, 
controlled the movements of trustees in their dealings with 
the world, and exercised their power in numerous other ways 
(Holloway, 1951: 68).
To a certain extent the seeds for this aggrandizement 
of power and privilege were to be found in the Mil­
lennial Laws which first restricted the amount and 
kinds of criticism that could be directed against a 
community’s officials and permitted officials more 
personal privacy from the brethren and more per­
sonal contact with the world outside.
The Shaker experiment was therefore far more 
successful in achieving economic and social equality 
than it was in achieving political equality. Yet, con­
sidering the social class origins of the majority of 
its members, it can be said that most of them expe­
rienced considerably more equality within the com­
munities than they had known—or would have 
known—had they not joined. There was an almost 
unbelievable amount of equalization accomplished 
and maintained. And it was, perhaps, against this 
backdrop of generalized equality, and because of it, 
that the very restricted and closely scrutinized power 
and privilege differentials of the religious hierarchy 
seemed so great. There is little evidence of genuine 
dissatisfaction (in the form of protests, impeach­
ments, etc.) within the ranks concerning excesses on 
the part of the hierarchy. Perhaps this is because 
prestige was fairly evenly distributed throughout the 
membership of the community. There is no indication 
that many members aspired to become deacons or 
officials of the order, nor was there any great venera­
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tion or vexation over those who did. While the Shak­
ers are, of course, a unique case, this example 
calls into question the assumption made by some 
current theorists that prestige is primarily a function 
of power and privilege (cf. Lenski, 1966: Chapters 
2-3).
The factors that contributed to the successes and 
the failures of the Shaker stratification experiments 
are similar to those factors that explain the success­
es and failures of the American communal experi­
ments in general. A discussion of those factors will 
be presented in section VI. By way of concluding 
this analysis of the Shaker stratification experiment, 
the benefits and the costs of the experiment might 
be summarized as follows:
1. Costs to the individual:
a. Extreme restrictions on personal freedom.
b. Loss of the opportunity for sustained intimate relation­
ships including family life.
c. Celibacy and torment.
d. Lack of privacy and emotional support.
e. Some restrictions on individual legal rights (to sue the 
community, etc.).
f. Loss of all personal property and inheritance.
g. Some loss of honor through public criticism.
2. Benefits to the individual:
a. Security, sense of purpose, welfare benefits. Consider­
able social mobility for most members.
b. Opportunity to select, master, and improve on several 
trades.
c. Considerable personal prestige in the greater society, 
and equality of prestige within the community.
3. Costs to the greater society:
a. Legal and ethical challenges, and some community 
level conflict.
4. Benefits to the greater society:
a. High quality consumer and producer goods. Charity, 
welfare, tourism, increased property values. Economic 
stabilization. Land development. Inventions. Assistance 
in reducing the intensity of certain social problems: 
slavery, poverty, public dependency, and discrimina­
tion against minority groups.
Since most of the items listed above are self-explana­
tory, only a few additional remarks are in order. 
There is no evidence that a Shaker experience ever 
«ruined anyone’s life,» nor, for that matter, is there 
much evidence to suggest that it disillusioned or de­
prived any of its adult members. There was consider­
able dissatisfaction among many of those who were 
raised in Shakerism—particularly once they real­
ized that there were other alternatives and that such 
a disciplined existence was, in fact, voluntary for 
the adults. Dissatisfaction of the young increased 
throughout the 19th century until, it might be guessed, 
the majority of the young rejected membership upon 
reaching adulthood (cf. Andrews, 1963: Chapter XI).
On the other hand there is every indication that 
Shaker life was at least fulfilling and free of unhap­
piness for most members:
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At first sight, this seems a spartan and even a stultifying life; 
but it is worth remembering that the rules and regulations of 
any society seem more fierce on paper than they do in practice, 
when they are not always observed absolutely to the letter. 
It is also worth remembering that membership, even of the 
Church Order, was voluntary, and could be renounced, as El­
kins renounced it, at any time. We should not assume, there­
fore, that the Shakers were unhappy because they were subject 
to restrictions and repressions that might seem to us to be un­
bearable. The facts of Shaker craftsmanship alone, deny un­
happiness (Holloway, 1951: 74).
Whatever psychologists might make of the peculiar religious 
attitude of the Shakers, the Shakers themselves found fulfill­
ment in it (Holloway, 1951: 74).
The phenomenal success of the societies, rising from poverty, 
scorn, and persecution to positions commanding respect, proved 
to the former that there was no natural desire for private 
property. In these village families there was no want, no need 
for charitable institutions. All lived in peace and harmony with­
out violence or crime of any kind (Andrews, 1963: 134).
Apparently the first Shaker communities were a 
source of considerable antagonism to the indigenous 
population wherever they located, for there are sever­
al reports of confrontations staged by irate and 
well-armed villagers protesting everything from the 
Shakers’ celibacy, to their procurement of children, 
to their very presence (Andrews, 1963: 91). During 
the first quarter of the century, however, a legal prec­
edent had been established and Shaker ordinances 
and practices were adjusted accordingly so that there 
was remarkably little overt conflict between not only 
the Shaker communities and the greater society, but 
between most other communal adventures and the 
greater society.
The Shakers became known as good and charita­
ble (if reserved) neighbors both to the greater socie­
ty at large and to other sects, minorities, and exper­
iments across the United States (Andrews, 1963: 
221). They were active and apparently quite effective 
in their antislavery and antipoverty campaigns.
The liberal attitude of the Kentucky Believers toward the ra­
cial question doubtlessly complicated their relations with the 
world: the Kentuckians 'speak evil of them without cause,’ 
Finch noticed in 1844, for 'the Shakers in their midst, all free, 
wealthy and happy, are an everlasting reproach upon them and 
their accursed slavery system’ (Andrew, 1963: 215).
As with many of the other communal experiments 
that followed them, the Shakers were as inventive as 
they were persevering. A list of their many mechani­
cal improvements and inventions ranges from the 
screw propeller to the common clothes pin (Andrews, 
1963: 113). The most important «invention» of the 
Shakers, however, was in founding and maintaining, 
with marked success, a form of communistic society 
that inspired so many other experiments in radical 
social existence.
... and if their demands upon life were few, if they employed 
hired labour on a small scale, if they owned property in land, 
if their communism did not extend beyond the confines of a 
single society, they nevertheless held together through the 
cohesive force of these very limitations. By thus maintaining 
a stabilised society, the ordering of which was so successfully 
conducted, the Shakers made their greatest contribution to the 
community movement.
They were the first to show that communities could be pros­
perous, neat, orderly, and of long duration. Their fame spread 
far. Robert Owen studied first-hand reports of them in Scot­
land, and was thus encouraged to make his own experiments; 
they were visited, for advice and observation, by founders of 
communities throughout the nineteenth century (Holloway, 
1951: 79).
IV. the stratification experiment 
in the Oneida community
The «goal» of the Oneida stratification experiment 
was similar to that of the Shaker community. One of 
the principles stated by the original members insti­
tuted the practice of communism while it concurrent­
ly implanted what was to be the seed of inequality—- 
an autocrat:
They agreed to an absolute community of property, including 
people as well as material possessions. Further, they recog­
nized the ultimate authority of God in all things, and they sub­
mitted to the will of John Humphrey Noyes as «the father and 
overseer whom the Holy Ghost has set over the family thus 
constituted» (Carden, 1969: 21).
As was also the case with the Shakers, it appears 
that the Oneida Communalists were concerned more 
with economic and social equality than with politi­
cal equality because there is very little evidence of 
their dissatisfaction with the distribution of power 
through at least 20 of the 30 years the community 
existed—-and yet there was considerable political 
inequality. In the case of Oneida, however, authori­
ty was vested not in a body of law but almost exclu­
sively in one man—the founder, John Humphrey 
Noyes. Although Noyes professed democratic prin­
ciples and authorized numerous committees to study 
and administer various community functions, he 
alone decided what issues would be voted upon and 
who would chair the committees; and he retained and 
exercised the right to reject most suggestions or 
protests. He experienced very little opposition until 
the last few years of the community’s existence not 
only because he surrounded himself with a circle of 
efficient and loyal disciples but also because he ap­
parently was a very skilled charismatic, a shrewd 
businessman, and a rather just and compassionate 
fellow (Carden, 1969: 29-30). Besides that, if not be­
cause of it, Oneida was a «booming» success. After 
its first 10 years it grew increasingly more wealthy 
and prestigious. And the wealth, as well as much of 
the prestige, was quite equally distributed within the
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community. From all indications there was complete 
communalism of property and income. And while 
there was extensive occupational differentiation, re­
wards were not distributed on the basis of occupa­
tional differences (Carden, 1969: 66). Although there 
Was some rotation of members into the various me­
nial jobs, financial prosperity enabled the communi­
ty to employ outside labor for most of this work. As 
a result, the community members usually served as 
managers, foremen, or as skilled laborers in Onei­
da’s many small farming and manufacturing enter- 
prizes. Members were permitted to work in those 
activities where they demonstrated the most talent 
and motivation (Carden, 1969: 66).
While the Oneida members experienced consider­
ably greater social equality than they would have 
known in the outside World, social values were in 
part distributed according to a very subtle mecha­
nism called the order of «ascending fellowship.» All 
of the community members could be ranked in an 
ascending order according to the level of spiritual 
perfection they had achieved (Carden, 1969: 52). And, 
of course, it was only natural for those who had been 
«perfecting» for the longest time, and for those who 
had «ascended» closest to the patriarch Noyes to be 
furthest along in the fellowship. It was on the basis 
of the ascending fellowship that certain mild forms 
of social inequality came to exist. There was some 
age stratification, with the older male members usual­
ly having the privilege of first choice in food, clothing, 
and sex partners. While women were liberated from 
many of the more subordinating roles and jobs be­
cause of birth control, communal marriage, a nurs­
ery, and outside labor, the natural superiority of 
men was accepted in principle (Carden, 1969: 67). 
However, some authors conclude that, for all prac­
tical purposes, women were on an equal footing with 
men (cf. Holloway, 1951: 191).
There was no institutionalized educational strati­
fication practiced. Children were educated by the com­
munity up through the age of 26, depending prima­
rily on each student’s own interest in academics. A 
considerable number of Oneida children went on to 
the better colleges and universities to continue their 
education at the expense of the community. Many 
of them returned to Oneida afterwards and took up 
professional, scholarly, and managerial pursuits.
In summarizing Oneida’s stratification successes 
it is apparent that the extent of equality achieved 
cannot be discussed independently from the kind of 
equality being considered. There is no doubt that 
there was very substantial economic equality, and to 
a lesser extent, also substantial social equality at O- 
neida. Only in the final years of the experiment were 
there any important internal differences concerning 
social inequalities. And while there were considera­
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ble differences in power and prestige based on one’s 
«spiritual» relationship with John Humphrey Noyes, 
these differences often were not exercised—or at 
least they were not exercised in a whimsical manner. 
The inequalities were legitimized both by tradition 
and by Noyes’ charismatic personality. And the dif­
ferences were relative rather than absolute. A mem­
ber was not denied access to a scarce resource, he 
was just denied priority over it. And since very few 
resources at Oneida were scarce, there were very few 
protestations. Members might not have exercised 
much authority with other members, but they certain­
ly exercised considerable power in dealing with an 
outside world of laborers and tradesmen.
An analysis of the factors related to Oneida’s strat­
ification successes will be delayed until the next sec­
tion. The costs and benefits of the Oneida experi­
ment would be as follows:
1. Costs to the individual:
a. Limited freedom irt the areas noted.
b. Threat of rejection by the greater society (for sexual 
practices).
c. The loss of the opportunity for sustained intimate re­
lationships, conventional family life, etc.
d. Some loss of honor through public criticism within the 
community.
2. Benefits to the individual:
a. Security, considerable wealth, desirable job, sexual 
freedom, some increased social mobility, happiness, 
broad and excellent education, welfare, professional 
advancement.
3. Costs to the greater society:
a. Legal and ethical challenges.
4. Benefits to the greater society:
a. Economic and cultural improvement. Industrial and 
agricultural development and innovation. Increased 
property values. Tourism, charity, and plentiful em­
ployment.
Perhaps the only comments necessary concerning 
the costs and benefits would be to note that prior to 
the dissolution of the community in 1879 a number 
of the members had intermarried, and a considera­
ble number of them married shortly after Oneida 
disbanded. Many of the members went into private 
or corporate enterprize (Carden, 1969: Chapter III). 
While this might have been expected, given their ex­
perience as managers and the fact that many of them 
had been married before joining the order, both of 
these «reversions» might indicate the ascendance of 
individualistic over communalistic values. Or at least 
they indicate, along with the demise of Oneida itself, 
that the individual benefits did not greatly exceed 
the individual costs involved in the experiment. It is 
also important to note that since many of the Oneida 
communalists were of middle class origin and were 
fairly well educated and skilled when they joined the 
community, they were less dependent on the commu­
nity for providing them with a livelihood and a way 
of life.
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V. stratification and the American 
communal experiments
Given the diversity of the American communal ex­
periments, it is not at all surprising that there was 
considerable diversity in their goals, particularly 
their «real» stratification goals. To the extent that 
the concept «goals» applies to these experiments, it 
might be said that most of them assumed from the 
outset that they had established a communist socie­
ty. Their goal, then, was to endure. If this is too great 
an assumption, then it might be more safely assumed 
that, in general, the communities did attempt to sub­
ordinate individual self-interest and behavior to the 
common good of the order (Nordhoff, 1965: 390), 
and that this usually required, at the least, communal 
use and control of individual property (Nordhoff, 
1965: xvii).
In evaluating the successes and failures of these 
stratification experiments, it is perhaps somewhat 
tautological to conclude that they generally achieved 
a very considerable degree of economic equality; for 
had they not done so, then they might never have 
been considered to be communistic endeavors in the 
first place, or they might have disintegrated before 
being recorded. At any rate, it is apparent that most 
of the experiments were able to equalize economic 
differences substantially for at least more than a 
fleeting moment. Bushee argues that they reduced 
the range of economic differences among members 
considerably and that they improved the quality of 
life for almost all members (1905: 654). In almost 
all cases stratification based on occupational differ­
ences was reduced. There is some indication that 
occupational stratification in these communities was 
positively correlated to occupational differentiation 
and to the economic value of non-agrarian over a- 
grarian income. Communities generally upgraded 
the quality as well as the importance of labor so that 
previously unskilled (male and female) workers be­
came skilled, and the skilled became multi-skilled. 
The skills were definitely appreciated both in the 
community and in the greater society. At least one 
author reports that while communalists were willing 
to learn and to assume a variety of jobs, there was 
usually widespread dissatisfaction with policies of 
equal rewards for what was, intrinsically, unequal 
work (Bushee, 1905: 650).
There was generally appreciably greater social e- 
quality in the communities than in the social settings 
in which the members originated, but the equaliza­
tion of social differences seldom approximated the 
equalization of economic differences. In almost all 
cases sex and age differences in the distribution of
values were reduced—but never eliminated.1 Far 
greater (and more easily measured) equality of ed­
ucation existed than in the greater society. In almost 
all cases the communities established and operated 
their own education system and either required equal 
schooling for all children (and not infrequently the 
adults as well), or required a certain level of school­
ing for all children, with some children permitted 
to continue on with their studies based on their own 
motivation, and, occasionally, their performance. It 
is particularly hard to gauge the success of these ex­
periments in reducing status group differences since 
so many of them were founded on the basis of ethnic, 
religious, political, or class homogeneity, and since 
so many of them recruited in such a manner as to 
preserve their homogeneity. Most communities were 
at least ideologically committed to status group e- 
quality. But, once again, their recruitment mech­
anisms generally insured that their egalitarian ideol­
ogies went unscathed.
The political inequalities or the potential for polit­
ical inequalities that existed at Oneida and at most 
of the Shaker communities were not atypical of the 
inequalities that existed in many other experiments. 
There were pure democracies, such as Icaria, that 
were very successful (Nordhoff, 1965: 393)—-but 
there were far more that were not. Based on an ex­
cellent recent study of the importance of commitment 
mechanisms to communal success (longevity) there 
is reason to believe that considerable political in­
equality existed in many, if not most, communities 
and that the extent of political inequality in a com­
munity was positively associated with the communi­
ty’s success—-all other factors held constant (Kan­
ter, 1967: Chapter III). Most historians of the period 
reported the presence of undemocratic authority 
structures (often approximating Weber’s charismatic 
authority structures) that often resulted in quite 
widespread and intensive political inequalities. And 
it seems fair to conclude that in most cases the major 
differentials in power and privilege within these com­
munities were based primarily on the political sys­
tems they legitimated, if only because the economic 
and social systems they legitimated often approached 
the egalitarian. And to repeat a viewpoint intro­
duced earlier in this paper, it seems that the actual 
importance and extent of political inequality in these 
experiments has been distorted for several reasons. 
First, political inequalities seemed more severe than 
they really were simply because they existed in sys­
tems where there were relatively few other signifi­
cant inequalities. Second, while the potential for ex-
1. A possible exception to this assertion would be the Shak­
ers, who may have, in fact, approximated an absolute state 
of sexual equality. See the discussion in Section III.
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treme political inequality was very real, in actuality 
the political systems generally chose to be quite egal­
itarian. The autocrats, the charismatics, and mem­
bers of the religious and political hierarchies simply 
did not exercise many of their options, or they did 
not exercise them very often, or very fully. Third, 
potential inequalities existed mainly between, not 
within, two, or at most four levels—-and the vast ma­
jority of the community members were at one of these 
levels. That is to say that if there were class systems 
within these communities, then, they were either 
two-class systems (the governors and the governed) 
or four-class systems (the autocrat, his chosen 
coterie, the brethren, and the novitiates and children). 
Within these classes there was very substantial 
equality—of every type. And it was this generalized 
equality that made tolerable the political (and to a 
more limited extent, social) inequalities that existed 
between classes. In summary then, the American 
communal experiments were in fact quite communal 
—if not at the community level—then certainly at 
the sub-community (social-political class) level.
The costs and benefits of the communal experi­
ments include most of the costs and benefits that 
characterized the Shaker and Oneida experiments. 
To supplement the previous discussion of those costs 
and benefits, it might be added that communal ex­
istence reduced the potential range of individual wealth 
and worldly success—a fact that became increasingly 
more bothersome to communalists of the latter half 
of the 19th century (Bushee, 1905: 655), and that sus­
tained communal existence reduced an individual’s 
chances of ever becoming wealthy or «successful.» 
This kind of an insight, of course, would be of greater 
concern to a community who se members were of mid­
dle class origins (such as Oneida) and were there­
fore more success oriented and potentially up­
wardly mobile. A number of historians claim that 
the security of established communal life dampened 
individual creativity along with high physical and 
mental achievement. Bushee dismisses many of their 
mechanical inventions as having utility only within 
communal settings and as being the products of fer­
tile minds that were recruited into the communities 
rather than developed there (1905: 657).
There is greater certainty concerning the individ­
ual benefits. Nordhoff estimated that in 1875 the 
average communalist in America was worth $2,000.00 
and possessed the equivalent of over 36 acres of farm­
land (1965: 385). However these statistics were deter­
mined, and whatever they really mean, Nordhoff’s 
point is that the communal member was worth a lot 
more than his counterpart in society. Nordhoff also 
argues that the communal workpace was steady but 
unhurried because work was considered to be ethical­
ly and spiritually important. He reports that commu­
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nal life on the whole was comfortable and satisfying 
(1965: 400). Most authors tend to agree that the be­
nefits of communal life for the individual member 
surpassed the benefits of an alternative existence in 
the greater society.
Every observer agrees that life in the successful communities 
was far superior to industrial or agricultural life in 'the world’. 
The labourers and artisans were freed from poverty and inse­
cure dependence upon the whims and caprices of employers and 
stock markets. Associative effort prevented wasted energy, 
produced many labour-saving devices, and resulted in a higher 
standard of living than that of the isolated working-man (Hol­
loway, 1951: 222).
A thorough discussion of the costs and benefits 
realized by the greater society from the communal 
experiments would require a separate volume. It 
would be hard to argue, however, that the benefits 
did not far exceed the costs, for many of the reasons 
already mentioned. At a much greater level of anal­
ysis (and speculation) there is every reason to be­
lieve that these communal experiments not only in­
spired many other better informed (yet not necessar­
ily more successful) experiments that followed, and 
that they whetted the imaginations and passions of 
such global social thinkers as Karl Marx (Kanter, 
1967: Chapter 1), but that they had a direct and im­
mediate influence on the governments and the so­
cieties that spawned them (Bestor, 1970: 230-271). 
For these experiments in communism on a limited 
scale Were only as successful as one’s concept of com­
munism is restrictive.
If he is satisfied by a social ownership of production, at least 
a partial social ownership of all property, an equitable system 
of distribution, and equal opportunity for all, then communism, 
without any doubt, flourished peacefully and harmoniously in 
a number of societies for a sufficient number of years to prove 
its feasibility. But the reader who is particular about the so­
cial machinery, the motives, and the ultimate basis of commu­
nism may refuse to acknowledge that it ever proved itself in 
these community experiments (Holloway, 1951: 221).
VI. factors related to the success of American 
communal destratification experiments 
and to stratification theory
In order to best understand some of the factors 
related to the success of the American communal 
destratification experiments, it is helpful to review 
first the primary factors that contributed to the suc­
cess of the communities in general (measured by 
their longevity) based on the consensus of a number 
of historians of the period.1 These factors, all of 
which were positively associated with the success of 
a given community are:
1. These historians are listed in the Bibliography.
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1) A strong leadership structure and replacement 
mechanism that precludes succession crises;
2) A strong flexible authority system across most 
institutional areas (but often centralized in one 
institution such as the religious institution);
3) A comprehensive ideology, particularly a more 
traditional form of religious or familial ideology, 
that subsumes, or at least supplements, the com­
munist ideology and which permits some form of 
individual recognition and identity;
4) A perceptive and effective recruitment proce­
dure, a rigorous and lengthy indoctrination-con- 
version procedure that assures the compatibility 
or homogeneity of values and behavior, and 
a summary dismissal or expulsion procedure;
5) An ability to train, motivate, and retain young 
members and to integrate them effectively into 
the social structure of the community;
6) A greater social and physical environment that 
does not provide sufficient individual equality 
or fulfillment but that is conducive to collective 
attempts to do so.
It is important to understand that while these 
might have been the primary factors contributing to 
the success of the communal experiments, there is 
no necessary relationship between these factors and 
the success of the destratification experiments. In 
fact, if it is assumed that the goal of the stratification 
experiments was to achieve distributive equality, then 
three of these factors might have been detrimental 
to the realization of that goal. For if factors such as 
a strong successive leadership structure, a strong 
cross-institutional authority system, and an ideology 
that supercedes communism do not imply some form 
of inequality by definition, or if they do not imply at 
least a partial subversion of communist principles, 
then at least they call into mind a very lengthy histor­
ical record that has found them to be empirically 
associated with inequality. It might be argued (along 
Marxist lines) that factors such as these are only 
temporary expedients through which communism 
will eventually be achieved. But, once again, the his­
torical record (or at least an interpretation of the 
historical record according to Michels) finds this 
argument to be unconvincing. Authority structures 
tend to become self-perpetuating. And, of course, 
for Mosca, a two-class system composed of the gov­
erning and the governed is a basic fact of socio­
political existence.
More convincing is the argument that the other 
three factors were extremely important in determining 
the success of the destratification experiments. 
And the relationship of these factors to the success 
of destratification experiments, at least at the com­
munity level, is particularly important to stratifi­
cation theory. The relationship of the fourth factor,
the effectiveness of a recruitment-indoctrination-ex­
pulsion procedure, to a community’s success de­
monstrates that a community need not change the 
self-interested nature of man in order to assure the 
primacy of communal over personal goals—-if, as­
suming that the degree of individual self-interested­
ness is normally distributed, it can recruit those in­
dividuals who are least self-interested! And it appears 
that the American communal experiments did at­
tract and assimilate many individuals with rather 
unique personalities and ideologies (Nordhoff, 1965: 
388, 400; Carden, 1969: xviii). Bushee reports that 
communalists tended to drift from one experiment 
to another (1905: 652), although this mobility might 
have been more a product of the high-failure and 
low-longevity rate of communal endeavors than of a 
vagabond spirit among communalists. Of course 
there is some merit to the argument that the person­
ality types that gravitated to communal adventures 
were not so much less self-interested than others, 
but that they were simply peculiar (cf. Bushee, 1905: 
652).
The fifth factor, a community’s ability to hold its 
young members once they reached adulthood, is re­
lated to both the fourth and the sixth factor, the 
failure of the greater social and physical environ­
ment to provide sufficient individual equality or ful­
fillment while remaining conducive to collective at­
tempt to do so. By being able to retain its young, a 
community reduces its dependence on recruitment 
for manpower replacement and provides social and 
cultural continuity for the community. Yet as the 
19th century progressed, it became increasingly more 
difficult for communities to retain their young. Per­
haps, contrary to the sociological imagination, this 
was because self-interestedness of the young was nor­
mally distributed, and therefore, the less self-interest­
ed were the most strongly attached to the commu­
nity. Of course, numerous rhetorical questions arise 
such as, «why, then, did the defections increase 
during the century?» Even disregarding the popula­
tion genetics of self-interestedness, the fact that de­
fections of the young seemed to have increased at 
something of an exponential rate after mid-century 
indicates that communal life was becoming less pal­
atable either because it was becoming more harsh 
(therefore «pushing» the young out) or because the 
external social and physical environment was be­
coming less harsh (thereby «pulling» the young out). 
There is every indication, once again based on con­
sensus of the authors listed in the Bibliography, that 
it was the latter.
Frederick A. Bushee, one of the more astute schol­
ars of the communes, concluded that the primary 
factors related to the dissolution of many of the com­
munities had little to do with the application of corn-
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munism, for that was relatively successful, although 
he mentions that there was generally widespread 
dissatisfaction with policies of equal rewards for 
what was intrinsically unequal Work (Bushee, 1905: 
650). The primary factors centered around the dis­
harmony within the communities concerning future 
goals and policy (1905: 649-660). After mid-centu­
ry, almost all evidence points to the presence of 
liberalist—not reformist—-protestations within the 
communities. Almost without exception, dissensus 
was based on the success and the appeal of collec­
tivism and individualism in the greater society rather 
than on the failure of communism within the com­
munities. And, not surprisingly, the appeal was great­
est and the appeals were loudest among the young.1
The point of all of this is that the primary factor 
that contributed to the success and then to the «fail­
ure» of the American communal destratification 
experiment was the American destratification experi­
ment! By the third quarter of the century the United 
States was becoming unmistakably and inexorably 
industrial. Accelerating technological change accel­
erated social change—-particularly in the economic 
and political spheres. Drawing on the social evolu­
tionary proposition that social inequality seems to be 
less prevalent in industrial societies than in their im­
mediate technological predecessors (Lenski, 1970: 
406-409), then it might also be proposed that the a- 
mount of inequality is somewhat negatively associated 
with the extent of industrialization in near-industri­
alized or in industrializing societies. The American 
experience would seem to support this argument.
At a less theoretical level it can be argued that the 
American distributive system was becoming increas­
ingly more attractive in both relative and absolute 
terms. And it was the inability of the communal ex­
periments to adapt, in order to compete socially, 
culturally, and economically with the greater society, 
that led to their demise. This argument supports the 
evolutionary postulate that specialization is achieved 
at the expense of adaptability; for the communal ex­
periments were both ideologically and socially (and 
all too often economically) specialized. Specialization 
was a product of their homogeneity. To succeed in­
ternally they depended on the homogeneity of be­
liefs, values, goals, ethnicity, class, and property to 
hold them together; and yet, to succeed externally 
they needed, increasingly, the heterogeneity with 
which to compete with an increasingly heterogenous 
social environment—and an environment that of­
1. The 19th century communes were not nearly so isolated, 
either physically, socially, or economically as is often assumed
to be the case. Nordhoff argues that the image of these 
experiments as remote and obscure escapist undertakings 
is in need of revision (1965: xv).
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fered, among other things, increasingly more oppor­
tunity and freedom for the individual.
Some of the more important socio-political envi­
ronmental factors that contributed to the demise of 
the American communal experiments were:
1) The increase of national consciousness after 
the Civil War;
2) The rapid development of an industrial econo­
my;
3) The rapid development of a nationwide trans­
portation and communication system;
4) A spiraling increase in land prices, particular­
ly in Western arable land;
5) The emergence of federal legislation and of laws 
that formalized the relationship between indi­
vidual citizens and the national government 
such as compulsory schooling, military service, 
and increased tax obligations;
6) The dissolution of foreign language enclaves 
(particularly in rural areas);
7) The extension of constitutional liberties and of 
popular sovereignty to most American citizens;
8) An increase in social mobility (particularly in 
urban social mobility) and in the power of pop­
ular government;
9) A major transformation in the religious insti­
tution towards secularism and service;
10) An emergence of government interest and activ­
ity in matters of public welfare, thereby reducing 
the primacy of church-related charities;
11) A resurgence of the individualist ethic promoted 
by the California goldrush, the Civil War, 
and a final frenzied rush to close the Frontier.2
Clearly, most of these factors are directly related to 
changes in the distributive processes of society, and 
almost all of them can be understood as factors that 
have contributed to increasing distributive equality.
A few additional remarks may be in order concern­
ing the importance of the American communal 
stratification experiments to stratification theory. 
Knowledge of these experiments tend to support, at 
least partially, the elitist response to the root stra­
tification question concerning the primary basis of 
inequality. That is to say that in so many of these 
experiments the more significant forms of inequali­
ty resulted from a need for social control of the so­
cial systems. Or, to be less functionalistic in phra­
seology, it might be said that in order to assure them­
selves of communal order and direction, communa- 
lists generally were willing to accept a very consider­
able amount of political inequality.
Second, a considerable level of sustained (and in­
stitutionalized?) altruism in human behavior is pos-
2. These factors were given by various authors listed in the 
Bibliography. See, in particular, Nordhoff (1965: xxiii).
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sible, at least on the limited scale of a community, 
if the environment is held constant at a high but un­
challenging level of productivity.
Third, a surprising number of historians of the 
communes posit, along with certain social theorists, 
the self-interested nature of human beings as a ba­
sic assumption of all human social thinking (cf. 
Bushee, 1905: 658; Holloway, 1951: 221; Hinds, 1961: 
159; Wrong, 1961; Lenski, 1970: 32-34).
And finally, the importance of ideology as a var­
iable related to the amount and the kind of inequal­
ity in a social system becomes all the more apparent 
based on an analysis of these communal experiments. 
For ideology was far more than just «after the fact 
justification» in these experiments. It was, in fact, 
the motivation and the direction in them. For without 
ideology, utopia could never happen.
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